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Abstract This article uses the need for more inspiration in 
people to act on climate change as a basis for exploring some 
thoughts on the societal and environmental challenges of 
climate change. It aims to provide ways of interpreting what is 
often presented on climate change without considering how 
the audience receives that information and might or might not 
be inspired to take action based on it. Different meanings of 
“change” are examined in the context of “climate change.” The 
term “adaptation” is similarly analyzed. Based on the under-
standing of those terms, four notions are defined and outlined 
in relation to decision-making for climate change adaptation: 
Ignorance versus “Ignore-ance,” surprise, foreseeability, and 
forecasting by analogy. The conclusions explore the interlink-
ages between society and the environment as well as how to 
turn lessons identified into lessons that are actually learned 
in order to be implemented. Achieving inspiration is not 
straightforward, but without it, the future will be bleak under a 
changing society and environment.
Keywords climate change, climate change adaptation, 
climat e change forecasting, climate change impacts
1 Climate Change and the Lack of 
Inspiration to Act
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has as 
its mission “To provide leadership and encourage partnership 
in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and 
enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life 
without compromising that of future generations” (UNEP 
2013, 100). The “-ing” words are particularly important: 
inspiring, informing, and enabling. Today, much of environ-
mental work, especially regarding climate, is about informa-
tion and action. There is often an assumption that with enough 
information about environmental problems and solutions, 
action will immediately follow.
The flaws of that assumption are well-documented 
(McKercher et al. 2010), even for scientists themselves (Stohl 
2008), in that the information-to-action connection is neither 
linear nor well-established. One of the missing elements 
might be the third goal in UNEP’s mission statement: to be 
inspiring.
Rather than a rational, systematic approach to observing 
the world and then thoughtful action in order to make a better 
world, perhaps we need more inspiration: people doing what 
is needed because they want to, because they feel passionate 
about it, and because they intuitively are driven to follow 
what they have come to believe.
This article explores some thoughts on the societal and 
environmental challenges of climate change through present-
ing and critiquing vocabulary and notions that are taken for 
granted, even though such notions might be contributing to 
the lack of action. It aims to provide ways of interpreting what 
is often presented on climate change without considering how 
the audience receives that information and might or might not 
be inspired to take action based on it.
2 Change
It is important to explore the word “change,” especially in the 
context of “climate change.” It seems that, aside from those 
groups dealing specifically with scientific climate change 
issues on a more or less daily basis, most people are uncertain 
regarding what is meant by climate change. That is especially 
the case since climate science notes that climate is constantly 
changing on all time scales: year-to-year, decade-to-decade, 
century-to-century, and beyond. The general public often 
refers to “climate change” when they mean to refer to 
unexpected climate variations on seasonal, interannual, and 
longer time frames. “Change” and “variability” can be used 
synonymously in general parlance about climate.
For so-called “experts,” “climate change” has two differ-
ent, common definitions. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), a UN-affiliated group for synthesiz-
ing and summarizing the science on climate change, defines 
the term to be “any change in climate over time, whether due 
to natural variability or as a result of human activity” (IPCC 
2007, 871). The United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), responsible for negotiations 
regarding international treaties on climate change, defines the 
term to be “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
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indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods” (UN 
1992, Article 1, Paragraph 2). That is, the scientific view takes 
climate change to be all climate trends, irrespective of the 
origin of those trends, while the policy measures focus on 
anthropogenic climate change. IPCC and UNFCCC defini-
tions of climate change differ at the basic level, yielding 
detrimental consequences for trying to support responses to 
“climate change” (Pielke Jr. 1998, 2005).
When “climate change” discussions reach the public, the 
media, and elected officials, their confusion is understand-
able. They have a right to ask: Which change in climate is 
being talked about and what does “climate change” actually 
mean?
Depending on location and livelihoods, climate changing 
in some way at some time and space scales may be welcomed. 
A somewhat warmer winter with less snow might seem posi-
tive to many Minnesotans. Many of the ramifications might 
not be considered, such as what happens to the other seasons, 
how ecosystems respond, and the resulting changes to recre-
ation, tourism, pests, and mold. A 2–3°C average warmer 
winter in places which are normally just below freezing can 
change snow into freezing rain and ice, making roads and 
sidewalks perilous while bringing down trees and power lines 
from the ice’s weight.
Thus, the word “change” when associated with climate has 
different, sometimes contradictory, meanings and implica-
tions for various observers, depending on what they are con-
sidering and what they seek in their location for living and 
working. One way to try to reduce the confusion is to separate 
those climate “changes” that we have been living with and 
adjusted to over seasons, years, and decades, from climate 
“changes” that society has not seen in millennia—perhaps 
never since human settlement. That will be the case for the 
changes expected to accompany a human-influenced global 
warming of the atmosphere in many Arctic locations.
Some literature suggests “dangerous” climate change as 
the phrase to use (Schneider 2001), but that has been debated 
extensively and does not really resolve the challenges noted 
above. Another possible suggestion, amongst many, would be 
the use of the notion of “deep” climate change (Fischer 1996) 
to represent the profound type of change that many scientists 
now say that future generations will likely need to adjust to.
As the climate changes and society adjusts, it is not just 
about climate change. There are other changes as well. Popu-
lation is increasing and its distribution is shifting towards 
urban settings, especially megacities, rather than the rural or 
small town basis under which humanity developed. Technol-
ogy is another factor, such as hand-held mobile devices 
becoming increasingly prevalent, even in megacity slums 
without running water or sewage along with remote farming 
areas where people have their own generators rather than 
reliable electricity.
As society and technology change, expectations and 
lifestyles change. People in more affluent countries seek 
increasing amounts of leisure time and enjoy the luxury of 
cheap flights for holidays and shopping, while fully knowing 
and accepting the contribution of that energy use to climate 
change and lack of sustainability. Adapting to climate change, 
as well as other forms of change to the climate, takes place 
within these wider contexts of societal change—and adjust-
ments sometimes result in zero net gain for sustainability.
It is not just the change itself that needs to be taken into 
consideration. Rates of change are as important as the type 
and direction of the change, particularly because society 
tends to respond more quickly and comprehensively to rapid 
changes than to slow changes. Yet the latter can often do much 
more damage over the long term, as well as being potentially 
preventable since there is time to act as the consequences are 
manifesting. Glantz (1994a, 1994b) refers to “creeping envi-
ronmental changes,” “creeping environmental problems,” 
and “creeping environmental phenomena” (CEPs). CEPs are 
small, often incremental but cumulative changes to environ-
mental conditions which, over time, add up to create major 
problems, often witnessed as a crisis or disaster once an 
undefined threshold has unwittingly been surpassed (see also 
Glantz 1999). CEPs include desertification, soil degradation, 
salinization of water supplies, and climate change.
“Creeping social changes” or “creeping social phenomen a” 
can be as important. The internet did not become a household 
service overnight. It took two decades from its initial appear-
ance for the first internet structure to become engrained in 
workplaces. Over the subsequent two decades, a shift was 
seen from dial-up internet to dedicated high-speed internet 
lines to wireless. Electricity has been common for more than 
a century, but it is just over the past decade or so that wireless 
electricity has become common.
Creeping changes do not preclude sudden (abrupt, 
step-like) changes, such as the earthquake that levels a city or 
the assassination that leads to a dictatorship or democracy. All 
changes are part of what drives society to change and the 
changes to which society must adapt. Change does not occur 
in a societal vacuum and each change can spark and influence 
other changes that need to be addressed as well.
Focusing on creeping changes and rates of change instead 
of searching for a “dread factor” (such as a step-like adverse 
climate change impact) to spark policy changes can be one 
approach to communicating what needs to be done—and to 
inspiring action for doing that. That is particularly the case 
because “climate change” and its consequences have often 
been seen and interpreted as something happening in the 
future—namely future decades of the 21st century—even 
though it is being witnessed now. Indigenous peoples from 
places in the Arctic and low-lying islands are reporting 
major environmental changes now that were expected under 
climate change at some time in the future (see http://www.
manystrongvoices.org).
The phrase that captures these challenges is “The future is 
arriving earlier than expected!” Climate change projections 
long into the future are appearing in places now. What does 
that mean for the rest of the world? It means that “creeping” 
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is actually not so creeping, but is on top of us now. What we 
initially thought would happen in several decades, seems to 
be manifesting over several years, such as the models of sea 
ice reduction under climate change underestimating what is 
seen in reality; observations of sea ice today are what the 
models projected would be seen in several years (Stroeve 
et al. 2007). Put another way, “2020 is likely to be the 
new 2050.” Demonstrating immediate or imminent changes 
can help in communicating what “change” means, how 
“climate change” is relevant, and what needs to be done in 
awareness-raising and in response.
3 Adaptation
Similar discussions are needed for the word “adaptation” 
which has been taken over by climate change researchers and 
now policymakers, after long use in research fields such as 
biology (Darwin 1859). Yet people have always adapted and 
adjusted to environmental changes at many time scales—
namely climate variability, trends, and changes—in tandem 
with adapting and adjusting to social changes.
IPCC (2007, 76) defines “adaptation” to be “Initiatives 
and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and 
human systems against actual or expected climate change 
effects. Various types of adaptation exist, e.g. anticipatory 
and reactive, private and public, and autonomous and planned. 
Examples are raising river or coastal dikes, the substitution of 
more temperature-shock resistant plants for sensitive ones, 
etc.” UNFCCC (2012) defines “adaptation” to be “Adjust-
ment in natural or human systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”
These definitions are more similar than for “climate 
change,” yet still highlight the complexities and challenges in 
different approaches to climate change. IPCC’s (2007) defini-
tion distinguishes between different types of adaptation, 
which in turn need further explanation and discussion. 
UNFCCC (2012) effectively just defines “adaptation” as 
being “adjustment” to climate, which humanity has done for 
millennia. The term “adjustment” has also long been in 
the scientific vocabulary regarding humanity dealing with 
climate and weather (White 1942/1945), so it is unclear why 
a new definition for a word, with a long non-climate history, 
was suddenly introduced. IPCC’s (2007) definition also seems 
to imply that adaptation deals with only negative impacts, 
whereas UNFCCC’s (2012) definition, in line with IPCC’s 
previous approach (Pielke, Jr. 1998), states specifically that 
exploiting climate’s “beneficial opportunities” is part of 
adaptation.
The obvious question of what is needed to inspire people 
to change voluntarily needs to be further detailed from the 
basis of the definitions: Adaptation to what? The definitions 
use phrases such as “expected climate change effects” (IPCC 
2007, 76) and “actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects” (UNFCCC 2012). As with “change,” “climate” and 
“climatic stimuli” do not have the same meaning to all people. 
Many languages do not even have words for “to adapt” nor do 
they differentiate between “climate” and “weather,” making 
it difficult to explain to people that they must “adapt” to 
“changing weather” over the long term!
Even IPCC (2007, 78) admits confusion over the word 
“climate”: 
Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average 
weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in 
terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a 
period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions 
of years. The classical period for averaging these variables is 
30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables 
such as temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a 
wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of 
the climate system. In various parts of this report different 
averaging periods, such as a period of 20 years, are also 
used.
“A statistical description” can be interpreted differently. 
Much more information than just the average (a statistical 
mean) of variables could be included, such as median, mode 
(that is most frequent occurrences), ranges, and extremes. 
Fully understanding “climate” means including seasonal to 
interannual variability, climate fluctuations and trends on the 
decade and century scales, climate change, extreme events, 
and seasonality. Seasonality is purposely separated out from 
variability because most people, whether rural or urban, live 
according to the expected characteristics and flow of the 
seasons. Even in more affluent countries, seasonality is 
important: putting on snow tires and airing out the radiator are 
hardly part of one’s summer routine.
Any relatively high impact event or extreme, such as a 
prolonged drought or flood that disrupts the flow of the 
seasons, tends to disrupt human livelihoods and ecological 
processes. The late onset of the rainy season or the early 
termination of rains can adversely disrupt the expected flow 
of the seasons. Even more affluent countries provide exam-
ples: in North American cities, the first snowfall, whether in 
September or December, is notorious for snarling traffic—as 
if a snowfall does not happen every year.
When we deal with adapting to climate change, we are 
acting beyond our seasonal routines and expectations and 
beyond previously experienced variability. Instead, both 
IPCC (2007) and UN (1992) refer to a new global climate 
state, contrasting with what humanity has come to assume is 
“normal,” despite always having experienced climate trends 
and variability. But “adaptation” is not just a “solution”—it 
can also be a problem creator.
Adapting to climate change is not a one-time effort. 
Climate goes through changes on all time scales meaning that 
societies are constantly adjusting to variable and changing 
global-to-local climate regimes. That is why continual moni-
toring of social and environmental conditions, with effective 
early warning when necessary, is important. Societies must be 
sensitized to change direction—to be inspired to adapt and 
adjust—as more information is acquired and as the climate-
society-environment knowledge base is further expanded.
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But adaptation itself generates its own set of societal 
consequences. To make adaptation efforts more effective, 
governments must simultaneously identify and prepare for 
the ripple effects of their adaptation measures. For climate 
change, migration is described as both an adaptation response 
and a failure to adapt (Foresight 2011). Despite eviscerating 
critiques of the entire notion (Hartmann 2010), extensive 
literature continues to be published on the topic, but much of 
it lacks thorough examination of the ripple effects beyond 
predictions of conflict. Climate change’s consequences for 
identity, culture, sovereignty, and ecosystems deserve much 
more attention.
Each proposed adaptation response to climate variability, 
extremes, or change must (not “could” or “should”) be 
accompanied by statements about the proposer’s awareness 
of the likely downstream, second-and-third order effects of 
the proposed adaptive measure. That creates an awareness 
that adaptation generates a cascade of its own impacts that 
might require adjustments (adaptations?) as well—possibly 
along the lines of “mitigating the impacts of adaptation”!
4 Decision-Making
4.1 Ignorance versus “Ignore-ance”
Despite the huge amount of academic and media coverage on 
climate change, many decision-makers and policymakers, 
along with many in the general public, still do not have exten-
sive knowledge about climate change, its impacts, or how to 
deal with the impacts. That is especially the case for people 
who, unlike indigenous peoples in the Arctic and many people 
on low-lying islands, do not feel that they are being directly 
affected right now. While recognizing the tenuous link 
between knowledge and action, many people are nonetheless 
ignorant of the science of climate change. Even for those who 
are interested in the science and have quite a bit of knowl-
edge, their perceptions of the urgency and severity of the 
problem are not always in line with what the science says. 
Those with the power to act can frequently lack the training 
and information that they need in order to better understand 
and respond to the impacts from and actions for climate 
change. They, too, can be said to be ignorant.
This level of ignorance is, to some degree, understandable, 
given that decision-makers and policymakers are generally 
not specialists. They are confronted by issues to which they 
must respond and they always seek a balance of needs among 
various political pressures. That ignorance, though, can be 
overcome in theory by getting their attention for a while 
to provide more information, even if extensive lobbying is 
required to achieve that.
A different and more challenging problem is “ignore-
ance.” Ignore-ance refers to those with the power, as well 
as their followers, who already have the basic information 
and understanding which they need regarding climate 
change, its potential consequences, and actions to avert those 
consequences—but they purposely choose to ignore that 
knowledge. The reasons that they ignore it can vary, such as 
not believing in science; not caring about climate change and 
its consequences; focusing on short-term benefits for increas-
ing their re-election chances; their sponsors (such as the coal 
and oil industries) telling them what to do; and pandering to 
the ignorance of their constituents who do not have the time 
or the inclination to sort out the implications of climate change 
issues.
Ignore-ance is harder to overcome than ignorance. If a 
large portion of an electorate brings enough pressure to bear 
on the elected officials, then there might be a chance of those 
with the power reversing their ignore-ance and acting on their 
knowledge. But strong incentives, particularly seeking short-
term gains and not wishing to change lifestyles, exist for both 
those with the power and the public to deliberately continue 
in ignore-ance.
Ignorance is not knowing something while ignore-ance is 
knowing something and not caring about it. Those who are 
ignorant can be inspired to learn; those with ignore-ance can 
be hard to inspire to action. The two fundamental lessons for 
those who wish to avoid both ignorance and ignore-ance are: 
What you don’t know and what you ignore can still hurt you, 
as climate change will if no action is taken; and Don’t believe 
everything you think, but instead, try to get full information 
and then to act on that information in order to actively avoid 
ignore-ance while minimizing your own ignorance.
4.2 Surprise
“Surprise” is a strange word. Often, it is not used in accor-
dance with its original meaning. The following definitions 
of surprise are paraphrased from the Oxford English 
Dictionary.
The act or an act of encountering something unexpect-
edly or suddenly, or of being taken unawares.
An unexpected or unanticipated occurrence or event; 
something astonishing or full of wonder.
The feeling or emotion due to the unexpected or due to 
an occurrence for which one is unprepared.
Alarm, terror, or perplexity caused by suddenness.
A key element of the different dictionary definitions of 
“surprise” is the word “unexpected.” Yet there are “knowable 
surprises,” though that might seem contradictory. Taking the 
example of drought and drought response for sub-Saharan 
Africa, there are aspects which are often articulated as being 
surprises to governments and the media, yet are certainly 
knowable and known:
Droughts, defined here as less rainfall than is needed 
for favorable crop production or for sufficient range-
land vegetation, often seem to catch governments 
unprepared to deal with them. Yet drought in sub-
Saharan Africa is a foreseeable and usual occurrence, 
even if localized manifestations and impacts are rare 
for the people affected—or their traditional coping 
mechanisms have been undermined (Fleuret 1986).
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During an El Niño event in the Pacific Ocean, there is 
an increased likelihood (but not a certainty) of drought 
in sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Horn of Africa 
and Southern Africa.
Food shortages are often the result of inappropriate 
land-use policies. There are many examples of people 
and governments being encouraged to grow crops 
that are not suited to the local or regional climate 
conditions. Growing wheat on irrigated farms in North-
eastern Nigeria is a good example because a wheat 
crop is more sensitive to adverse changes in rainfall 
and temperature in arid and semiarid areas than 
traditional dryland crops such as millet and sorghum.
In many agricultural areas, there is competition 
between growing food crops for local markets and 
subsistence, and cash crops for export markets. Subsis-
tence crops feed people but cash crops (such as qat or 
cotton) are grown for sale elsewhere. Farmers are paid 
for their cash crops, but if there is a drought and cash 
crop production falls sharply, then they have no food 
to eat or money to buy food in the local marketplace. 
That contrasts with having preserved food from their 
subsistence crops and using a diversity of crops includ-
ing drought-resistant ones, amongst other traditional 
techniques (Fleuret 1986).
Often, irrigation schemes are built to grow cash crops 
for export, which continue during droughts, even in 
countries with severe food shortages.
During prolonged droughts, often high-interest rate 
loans have to be repaid either in cash or in kind (such 
as by working on the fields of the lender) by those who 
had to borrow seeds for planting, food for the family, 
or funds to buy food. This creates and perpetuates an 
unequal relationship between the lenders and the 
borrowers. The borrower may have to work in the 
fields of the lender at critical planting and harvesting 
times, at the neglect of the borrower’s own fields.
The trigger for identifying a drought problem varies. 
Some people know a food problem is starting by look-
ing at the crop conditions in the field while others 
wait for signs of severe shortages such as people 
abandoning their villages in search of food.
Not all food aid goes to those in need. There are 
examples where food aid has been diverted by govern-
ments to keep the army loyal or has ended up being 
sold on the black market.
Pledges by donor governments to provide food aid 
are often not met. Many governments do not always 
follow through on their assistance pledges.
Many of the at-risk people with the highest vulnerabil-
ity to drought and malnutrition are known before a 
drought strikes, because they are the groups subject to 
the chronic vulnerability to most hazards: the poorest 
people, pregnant women, the elderly, and children.
It is well known that, in many places, the time of the 
year just prior to harvesting is known as the hunger 
season. People are hard at work in the fields, but their 
household food reserves tend to be at their lowest 
levels and their nutritional needs cannot be met.
During severe food shortages, population movements 
increase. Preparations can be made well in advance, 
focusing on keeping people in or near their villages by 
providing food and funds.
Each of these “surprises” is experienced continually and is 
well-known. While governments, development banks, and 
donor agencies might claim surprise when drought impacts 
appear, strategic long-range monitoring and planning would 
avoid the perceived suddenness and scramble to deal with an 
emergency.
Knowable surprises are not just limited to less affluent 
locations. Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in 
2005 causing the death of close to 2000 people and appar-
ently catching local, state, and national emergency managers 
by surprise. The flooding of New Orleans, Louisiana, in par-
ticular, seemed to be a surprise. The head of the U.S. Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at the time, 
Michael Brown, was not even prepared to travel at short 
notice to any emergency situation, let alone the areas hit by 
Katrina, despite that being his job. While the floodwaters 
were still rising, he wrote e-mails trying to find a dog sitter for 
himself so that he could travel to the damaged locations. A 
disaster in the United States on his watch was apparently such 
a surprise that he had no contingency plans for his pet!
Yet, everything that happened because of Katrina was 
knowable and was known. Aside from previous storms 
striking the area in 1947, 1965, 1969, and 1998, the flooding 
of New Orleans was previously described (Fischetti 2001) 
and emergency plans to deal with hurricane-related evacua-
tion existed (OEP 2000). The year before Hurricane Katrina, 
FEMA had conducted an exercise known as Hurricane Pam. 
From 16–23 July 2004 in Louisiana, hundreds of emergency 
response officials from all three levels of government simu-
lated landfall of a Category 3 hurricane along the Louisiana 
shoreline, leading to several meters of flooding in New 
Orleans with over one million people evacuated and up to 
60,000 people killed (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs 2006).
Little of what was learned from the Hurricane Pam 
scenario was carried out the next year as Katrina bore down 
on New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the 
edge of Categories 3 and 4, after over one million people had 
evacuated, and led to several meters of flooding in New 
Orleans. It was a knowable surprise which could have been—
and actually was—foreseen.
4.3 Foreseeability
In his law dictionary, Gifis (1991, 195–196) writes that “Fore-
seeability encompasses not only that which the defendant 
foresaw, but that which the defendant ought to have foreseen.” 
The notion of foreseeability comes from law and can be 
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interpreted as a qualitative expression of probability, in order 
to determine accountability or fault when someone has been 
injured or killed (or property has been damaged). That clearly 
applies to disasters as well, meaning that foreseeability is 
relevant for dealing with the potential hazards of climate 
variability, extremes, and change and foreseeing which 
adaptation measures should be implemented and when.
It is reasonable to expect that there are likely to be adverse 
consequences from people’s vulnerability to the hazard of 
climate and its changes on various time scales, especially if 
steps are not taken to reduce that vulnerability. Do those with 
the power to act beforehand have a legal, if not moral or 
political, responsibility for the resulting climate impacts? The 
case study by Holloway (2000) of the impending drought in 
southern Africa from 1991–1993 is instructive. The famine 
consequences of the drought were foreseeable. Those with 
the power to act took heed, led a massive food import and 
distribution effort, and averted a catastrophe.
Similar foreseeability was not acted on in mid-2002 when 
an El Niño-related drought and potential food shortages were 
warned about as being a strong possibility for Zimbabwe 
(Glantz and Cullen 2003). The background was previous 
years of political changes in land ownership and land use, 
linked to and part of dictatorial and corrupt governance from 
Robert Mugabe, indicating that food production was expected 
to decline across the country. Then, came a forecast for the 
onset of El Niño later that year with a strong potential for 
drought across southern Africa, starting in the growing season 
and continuing into 2003. Foreseeing a strong possibility 
of severe food shortages in Zimbabwe, as well as in other 
countries across the region which depend on Zimbabwe’s 
food exports, was straightforward.
Despite the foreseeability, Mugabe and his government 
did little to avert the crisis (see background and details in 
Howard-Hassmann 2010). By October 2003, 50 percent 
of Zimbabwe’s population was unable to meet their food 
needs. The food shortages continued for several years, 
particularly as Mugabe continued to interfere with farming, 
food distribution, and humanitarian aid. The leaders in power 
in Zimbabwe chose not to avert the foreseeable and prevent-
able disaster. This was clearly a case of political ignore-ance 
at the highest levels of government.
We know what the impacts of climate variability and 
extremes are and what those of climate change could be. 
They are foreseeable, yet needed action is not being taken 
even though we know now how to act. As with Zimbabwe, 
ignore-ance is clear.
4.4 Analogy
One way to try to inspire action is through analogies. Analo-
gies comprise a base and a target, with the base representing 
what we already have or know while the target is what we are 
trying to understand or wish to know (Gentner 1983). Analo-
gies can be used for (1) educating and providing information, 
particularly to connect with an audience through something 
which they know already; (2) parameterizing complex pro-
cesses; (3) forecasting future states, trajectories, or possibili-
ties for a system; (4) generating and describing policy options 
and responses; and (5) fulfilling a psychological need.
Analogies are useful for describing climate change and its 
impacts, particularly in terms of demonstrating what might 
happen in the future, that is, “forecasting by analogy” (Glantz 
1988). Forecasting by analogy is not about giving definite 
answers regarding future states of the atmosphere under 
climate change or regarding future states of society under 
climate change. Instead, it describes how societies have dealt 
with environmental changes previously, taking into account 
different degrees and rates of change, for applying that 
knowledge to what is expected under climate change in the 
future in order to work with society now to avoid detrimental 
consequences.
Decision- and policymakers often need real-world, 
tangible examples to understand what they face, particularly 
precedents (Neustadt and May 1986). Forecasting by analogy 
can give a reality to projections, imbuing credibility lacking 
in computer-generated scenarios or speculative descriptions.
As an example of using forecasting by analogy to address 
potential climate change impacts, the Cod Wars between 
Iceland and the United Kingdom can be examined. These 
countries had three major disputes over cod, which have been 
termed the Cod Wars. In 1958, Iceland unilaterally extended 
its fishing limits from 4 miles to 12 miles off its coastline. 
The United Kingdom objected, but was unable to change the 
situation. In 1972–1973, Iceland unilaterally extended its 
fishing limits to 50 miles leading to a two-year agreement 
between Iceland and the United Kingdom which limited the 
latter’s fishing rights within Iceland’s 50-mile limit. The end 
of that agreement led to the third war in 1975–1976. Iceland 
unilaterally extended its fishing limits to 200 miles leading to 
confrontations between Icelandic and British ships, including 
rammings, a few shots, and some crew injuries. As with 
the first two wars, the United Kingdom conceded the third 
war by permitting Iceland to control the claimed zone (Glantz 
1992).
Two of England’s cities significantly affected by the Cod 
Wars were Kingston-upon-Hull (shortened to “Hull”) on the 
north shore of the Humber Estuary and Grimsby on the south 
side of the Humber Estuary. The sudden restriction of fishing 
in Iceland’s rich waters severely limited the fishing-based 
livelihoods of these two cities. That led to significant liveli-
hood changes in both locations: a transfer of livelihoods to 
other sectors, migration, and reliance on social services. Fish-
eries, the basis of both towns previously, are no longer sig-
nificant for either place, although fish-related manufacturing 
is making a small comeback in Grimsby.
In terms of using the Cod Wars as an analogy for climate 
change impacts on fishing livelihoods, towns in Norway, for 
example in the Lofoten archipelago above the Arctic Circle, 
are expected to experience sudden changes in fisheries as 
climate change warms the ocean’s waters and changes food 
supplies. Without any substitution of new fish for the fish 
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currently exploited, as was the case for Hull and Grimsby, the 
Norwegian towns are likely to experience the same impacts 
as the English towns: a transfer of livelihoods to other sectors, 
migration, and reliance on social services. Presumably the 
first change, livelihood transfer, is preferable to the other two 
changes, migration and welfare.
Norwegian towns can use forecasting by analogy to be 
inspired to plan for the foreseeable changes, rather than being 
forced into them by surprise, as were Hull and Grimsby. 
Neither ignorance nor ignore-ance should be an excuse to not 
thinking ahead of foreseeable changes.
5 Society and Environment Dealing with 
Change: Beyond Lessons
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) was a 
major IPCC-like undertaking to assess “the consequences of 
ecosystem change for human well-being.” It embodied the 
ethos that there is self-interest in protecting ecosystems 
because of the goods and services that the ecosystems pro-
vide, part of the value system that ecosystems must “pay their 
way to survive” in a profit-driven globalized world. A tropical 
forest would be at risk of being chopped if it did not provide 
maximum benefit to a particular society—and that society is 
usually defined globally rather than locally.
An ecosystem that was considered to be expendable by 
policymakers is demonstrated by the demise of the Aral Sea 
in Central Asia. It was decided by those in power in the 1950s 
in the Soviet Union that a cubic meter of water to irrigate 
cotton production on desert sands was a hundred times more 
valuable than keeping the fish in the sea alive. As a result of 
that calculation, water from the two mighty regional rivers 
feeding the Aral Sea—the Amu Dar’ya and Syr Dar’ya 
Rivers—were diverted in such great quantity from entering 
the sea in the name of cotton production that, in a classic 
creeping environmental change, the fourth largest inland sea 
in the world in 1960 was significantly dried up after a few 
decades (Glantz 1999).
The phrase “ecosystem goods and services for human 
well-being” is part of the problem. Humans need the ecosys-
tems much more than the ecosystems need humans. The com-
plementary phrase “human goods and services for ecosystem 
well-being” must be considered at the same time in terms of 
what humanity can provide for ecosystems to survive—or, 
better, how ecosystems and humanity must work together for 
each one’s survival.
Along the same line of reasoning, it is time to stop separat-
ing society from the global climate system as many physical 
scientists are likely to do. Human activities influence atmo-
spheric behavior as a result of the gases added through indus-
trial and land-use practices, as well as a result of interfering 
with biogeochemical cycles through land-use practices that 
change atmospheric sinks for gases. Society, through chang-
ing sources and sinks of trace gases in the atmosphere, now 
has major influences on atmospheric composition and, hence, 
on climate. In this regard, society becomes like the planet’s 
physical features, being one more influence along with 
forests, oceans, and volcanoes, amongst others.
Such lessons, and others throughout this article, can be 
encapsulated in the phrase “lessons learned,” derived from 
the belief that individuals and societies learn from their deci-
sions that produced either good or bad outcomes—or both. 
An English adage is “Once burned, twice shy,” capturing a 
belief that we learn from our experiences, and that we want to 
learn from our experiences, especially bad ones that we wish 
to avoid repeating. Frequently with respect to disasters, close 
scrutiny of recommendations reveals that the lessons are 
really only identified, not actually learned. To be learned, the 
lessons must be implemented so that a change for the better is 
seen. Because they are called “learned,” there is an assump-
tion that the lessons are being addressed, when in fact, other 
issues perceived to be more urgent often appear and take over 
the agenda. Attention and funds are diverted away from the 
ongoing disaster recovery—and from the lessons identified 
regarding how to prevent disasters.
As an example (Glantz and Jamieson 2000), Hurricane 
Fifi slammed into Honduras in 1974, killing thousands of 
people and setting back development decades. In the after-
math, many lessons were identified about reconstructing to a 
less vulnerable state than before and dealing with hurricanes 
in the future. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated similar 
parts of Honduras, killing thousands and setting back devel-
opment decades. The lessons were not learned in that they 
were not implemented. Instead, they were merely identified 
and then society moved onto other tasks, with the armed 
conflicts across Central America being prominent, until the 
next hurricane hit and the same lessons were re-identified.
One approach for trying to focus on lessons learned 
rather than lessons identified is connecting each lesson or 
recommendation to a statement of “ramification”; that is, a 
statemen t of the foreseeable outcome if the lesson or recom-
mendation is not heeded. That would provide a measure of 
accountability if no action were taken on the lessons identi-
fied and adverse results recurred in the future. That would 
hopefully also provide a measure of inspiration to demon-
strate what could be avoided by taking appropriate action.
When it comes to dealing with a changing climate and a 
changing society, humanity, our leaders, and us as individuals 
have needed roles to play. Climate change is not just about the 
physical aspects of the climate system, but envelops a much 
broader scope since humanity is an integral part of that 
system. Humanity can no longer be passive about climate 
change, or merely “adapt” to the external changes happening 
within the physical climate system. Instead, humanity must 
be proactive as part of what could be termed “the greater 
climate system,” a system including society and society’s 
actions.
Achieving that is not straightforward. Education, training, 
awareness, and knowledge exchange still seem to lack suc-
cess at a large scale in terms of inspiration; mainly in terms of 
inspiring people to move from a passive role to an active one. 
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That includes chipping away at both ignorance and ignore-
ance to try to avoid plausible surprise. That includes using 
analogies to understand possible changes, thereby incorporat-
ing foreseeability into everyday actions and decisions. That 
means learning from the past without becoming a slave to 
it, to implement the lessons known and identified, without 
forgetting that new factors might be present and might emerge 
later. That will assist in a creative, innovative, flexible society 
which does not merely adapt to societal and environmental 
changes, but lives and thrives with them.
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